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ABSTRACT: When thinly traded growth stocks (TTGS) listed on a secondary exchange 
experience difficulty in gaining investors’ attention, one possible solution is to increase the 
intensity of disclosure. However, if the stock is traded on a quote-driven system, market 
makers can collude to maintain wide bid-ask spreads that discourage firms from disclosing. 
As a result, TTGS traded on a quote-driven system can face a liquidity trap that can prevent 
them from harvesting the benefits of increased disclosure activities. In this paper, we argue 
that the well-documented negative relation between disclosure and the bid-ask spread is 
likely to be moderated by the type of protocol chosen by exchanges to handle the trading of 
TTGS. To test our theory we use a unique setting created by the introduction of a hybrid 
order-driven protocol for TTGS in the UK. Following an increase in the disclosure activity by 
a TTGS, we find that the magnitudes of the predicted reductions in the bid-ask spreads are 
dependent on whether the TTGS switch their trading protocols. 
Keywords: Disclosure, Market Microstructure    JEL Classification: D82, D83 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether a firm’s incentive to make voluntary public disclosures is 
affected by the exchange market microstructure that is used by investors to trade the stock.  
When making trading decisions, investors condition on both public information (firm, analyst 
and news disclosures) about the operating conditions of a candidate firm and also the 
responses (trades) of other investors in the market. This later conditioning arises because an 
investor anticipates that other investors’ may have access to superior information and so does 
not want to be exploited by informed traders. How an investor learns about the trades of other 
investors depends critically upon the particular specification of the trading market 
microstructure that an exchange has chosen. The present study provides empirical data on 
two different trading systems which lead firms in equilibrium to make different disclosure 
decisions because of variation in the way information on trades is made available to 
investors. The principal contribution of this research is to argue that the observed disclosure 
practices of firms are driven not only by firm specific variables but also critically by choice 
(interaction) of the exchange protocol that determines the transparency of investors’ trades.  
An implication of this is that claims that observed disclosures represent equilibrium responses 
in a capital market are only valid within the context of the (constrained) exchange trading 
protocol in use. If that trading protocol was modified, the equilibrium firm disclosure levels 
could vary and hence the type of information available for pricing assets could be different. 
In other words, the way stock prices adjust following disclosures could be dependent upon 
the extent of transparency of the trades in the market. For large cap stocks, exchanges 
typically adopt similar trading protocols. In contrast, for growth stocks there is more 
observed variation in the use of different trading protocols. It is for these types of stocks that 
the interaction between firm disclosure incentives and trading system design are of most 
concern. In summary, this research looks at what happens to firms’ disclosure incentives 
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when the transparency of investor trades changes. We argue that when the transparency of 
trades improves, investors’ equilibrium bid ask spreads are reduced since investors benefit 
from observing how other (peer) investors react to firm disclosures. Hence, we predict that 
improvements in firm disclosures are likely to result in greater reductions in the bid ask 
spreads when trading is conducted under a more transparent trading protocol.  
To empirically analyse how the variation in trading protocols influences the degree to which 
firms’ disclosure activities affect bid ask spread, we exploit a unique setting in which thinly 
traded growth stocks (TTGS) trading on the London Stock Exchange’s Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) were able to switch from a quote-driven trading system (SEAQ) to 
a more (trade) transparent hybrid protocol (SETSmm).  We focus our analysis on the 170 
firms that switch from SEAQ to SETSmm and distinguish between high- and low-intensity 
disclosers. In using this setting, our tests are not restricted to observing just the separate 
effects of disclosure and the type of trading on bid ask spread, but capture their reinforcing or 
multiplicative effects on spread. The results indicate that firms which switch to SETSmm 
hybrid trading protocol see significant incremental benefits from high disclosure.  Next, we 
examine the extent to which equivalent improvements in disclosure affect the changes in 
spread before versus after switching to a more transparent trading system. We find that the 
threshold at which an increase in disclosure becomes beneficial (in terms of its negative 
impact on spread) lowers after switching to SETSmm. Finally, we analyse the behaviour of 
114 firms that do not switch to SETSmm and find no significant incremental effect of 
disclosure on spread. Additionally we carry out a bank of sensitivity tests using alternative 
proxies for disclosure measure and for the bid ask spread, and we also check for endogeneity 
bias in the model using a two-stage regression approach. These tests corroborate the original 
findings.  
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The research is organised as follows. In Section 2 trading protocols are briefly reviewed with 
emphasis on how trade transparency varies with protocol. Section 3 sets out the principal 
Hypothesis and discusses the implications for some previous accounting research. Section 4 
describes data and methodology. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis with the 
conclusion being presented in Section 6. 
2.  Trade Transparency and Market Microstructure 
Harris (2003) provides a detailed review of the trading protocols used in financial markets. 
The wide range of protocols can be broadly classified as being either order- or quote-driven 
markets with a range of hybrid market possibilities that mix specific features from either 
polar form. In quote-driven (dealer) markets, trading contracts are based on prices set by 
designated monopoly liquidity suppliers often called market makers. Sometimes, the 
possibility exists to negotiate a better price with a market maker, but they have private 
information on the bids and asks of other traders. In contrast, in a pure order-driven market, 
the constant flow of orders from traders provides the liquidity, which is transparent to all 
market participants. In such settings transparency is defined by the ability of market 
participants to obtain information on the trading process (pre or post trade).1 
These varying forms of trade transparency give rise to different incentives for market 
makers. A number of early papers2 argued that market makers (on a dealer market) have in 
the past acted in collusion to drive bid-ask spreads to wider levels than might result from pure 
competition. However, with the onset of greater regulatory scrutiny of potentially cooperative 
agreements, one might now wonder whether such behaviour is still possible. In response, 
Dutta and Madhaven’s (1977:247) theoretical work argues that even when market makers 
interact in a non-cooperative fashion, spreads in a pure dealer market might still be set above 
competitive levels. The authors refer to these spreads as the establishment of implicit 
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collusion. Specifically, they argue that this type of collusion can lead to “cases when dealers’ 
pricing strategies under implicit collusion coincide with those under explicit collusion”. 
Hence, bid ask spreads remain large, and as a result incentives for disclosure are reduced. In 
order to stop market makers from colluding to keep the bid-ask spreads high one response 
could be to introduce pure order based protocols which limit such behaviour.  However thinly 
traded stocks such as new growth stocks (TTGS) might suffer from extended periods of a 
lack of liquidity without any input from market makers. In response exchange designers have 
introduced3 hybrid microstructures that simultaneously balance the two issues with 
transparent orders and some limited input from market makers providing continuous 
liquidity.  
 
3. Hypothesis and Empirical Implications 
The accounting literature that explains how increased disclosure lowers the 
information asymmetries among traders and improves stock liquidity and bid-ask spreads 
(see e.g., Verrecchia, 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Espinosa, Tapia and Trombetta, 
2008; Welker, 1995;  Healy, Hutton, and Palepu, 1999;  Brown and Hillegeist, 2007) focuses 
primarily on large companies that trade on order driven markets characterized by high trade 
transparency. Since all market participants can obtain information on the trading responses of 
other agents, firms’ disclosure activities can be rapidly impounded into prices. Motivated by 
the literature of Section 2 this research argues here that since in contrast, TTGS may be 
traded on quote driven markets with less trade transparency, market makers may strategically 
set wide bid ask spreads which can provide a disincentive for firms to make voluntary 
disclosures. The following subsection describes an institutional setting in which the trading 
protocol was redesigned from a quote driven to a hybrid order driven system. This interesting 
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empirical setting allows us to explore how the firm disclosure decisions were affected by the 
choice of trading system.  
3.1. Disclosure and Trading protocols on the Alternative Investment Market 
Our study makes use of the introduction of the hybrid trading structure SETSmm to the 
London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investments Market (AIM) for TTGS. The Alternative 
Investments Market has a simplified regulatory environment4 that enables TTGS to raise 
capital from knowledgeable, mostly institutional, investors without having to incur the costs 
associated with complying with the stricter regulations for listing on the main market.5 Since 
December 2005, AIM firms have been able to trade on the SETSmm trading system that is a 
hybrid of the SETS and SEAQ. SETS is a purely open order-driven limit book for trading the 
most liquid securities from the FTSE100 and the FTSE250, and SEAQ is a quote-driven 
system of market makers for the majority of small- to mid-cap stocks. SETSmm offers 
greater trade transparency for these stocks relative to the quote-driven system where 
specialist liquidity suppliers typically have a monopoly on trading and market making. 
However, SETSmm is not a purely order-driven system because it allows for limited support 
from market makers that are designed to enhance liquidity and the execution of trades.  
With this redesign of the AIM trading system in mind this study investigate whether 
incentives to improve the disclosure activities of TTGS on AIM were enhanced by using a 
transparent hybrid trading protocol (SETSmm) instead of a quote-driven system (SEAQ). In 
other words, we examine whether improved disclosure efforts by TTGS on AIM are likely to 
result in greater reductions in the bid-ask spreads relative to when the trading is conducted 
under a quote-driven system. Towards this purpose, we start by observing the behaviour of 
284 firms listed on AIM from January 2002 to December 2008. We distinguish between 
firms that switch to SETSmm from those that do not (i.e., remained on SEAQ). Since hybrid 
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trading was available to AIM firms only from December 2005, we do not expect to see 
significant differences between the two groups of firms in terms of reduced bid-ask spreads 
as a function of disclosure from 2002 to 2005. After the introduction of the hybrid trading, 
firms that did not switch to SETSmm by definition cannot harvest the benefits from more 
transparent trading in terms of reduced bid-ask spreads, but we do expect those firms that did 
switch from SEAQ to SETSmm to experience reduced spreads for an average level of 
disclosure. Taking into consideration advances in the copious literature (e.g., Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000) that documents lower bid-ask spreads and better stock liquidity for firms 
with improved disclosures, our key argument here is that the extent to which changing the 
trading protocol reduces bid-ask spreads varies across high- to low-intensity disclosers. To 
analyse the combined effects of disclosure and the trading protocol on bid-ask spreads, we 
make a distinction between high- and low-intensity disclosers for each group (switching 
versus non-switching) of firms. We focus our analysis on the switching group and expect that 
high disclosers within this group, exhibit greater reductions in bid-ask spreads relative to low 
disclosers in periods following a switch from SEAQ to SETSmm. In other words, we argue 
that the impact of relative disclosure intensity (high versus low) on the bid-ask spread is 
greater in the period after a firm has switched to transparent hybrid trading than in the period 
before switching. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H1: The association between the level of the disclosure intensity and the bid-ask spread is 
greater for the switching group in periods after the switch from a quote-driven to a hybrid 
trading system. 
However, in a post-switching period, arguably firms can enter a different phase of 
their life cycle. For example, they can become larger with more dispersed ownership and with 
more diversified portfolios of business activities. Both might trigger greater intensity in their 
disclosure activities that, in turn, might affect the firms’ bid-ask spreads. In order to 
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investigate whether the association between disclosure and the bid-ask spread is determined 
either by the type of trading or alternatively by firm characteristics related to the stage of the 
life cycle of a firm, we also control for the behaviour of the non-switching sample before and 
after the introduction of hybrid trading to AIM. If the strength of the relation between 
disclosure and the bid-ask spread is influenced by the firm’s life cycle, then we expect to also 
observe a stronger relation between disclosure and the spread for the non-switching group (at 
a similar point in their life cycle) in the period after December 2005. After collecting data on 
firm age for both groups we argue that the relation between disclosure and the bid-ask spread 
is predominantly determined by the trading microstructure, rather than by life cycle 
considerations. Hence, we do not expect to see any significant difference in the strength of 
this relation before and after the introduction of SETSmm for the non-switching group of 
firms.6  
4. Data and Methodology 
The initial sample consists of the 284 firms listed on AIM from January 2002 to December 
2008. Out of the 284 AIM firms, 170 firms moved from SEAQ to SETSmm from December 
2005 to December 2008 (the switching group, i.e., “Adopters”), while 114 firms remained on 
SEAQ (the non-switching group, i.e., “Non-adopters”). Our analysis focuses on those 170 
firms that switched and we distinguish between firm-quarters before and after an individual 
firm’s move to SETSmm by using an indicator variable SET that equals one for quarters after 
and zero for quarters before the firm’s switch to SETSmm. Within both groups of firms 
(switching and non-switching), we distinguish between low- and high-intensity disclosers.  
4.1. Measurement of the Level of Disclosure Intensity 
In this subsection, after providing a brief overview of the general disclosure environment in a 
secondary market, we describe how the level of disclosure intensity is measured. 
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The TTGS listed on a less regulated secondary market face some special issues when 
they attempt to improve their disclosures given their lack of size and low visibility. 
Traditionally visibility problems can be mitigated by increasing the analyst coverage and 
moving exchange, but for TTGS, this mitigation might be very costly and difficult to achieve. 
Before being able to attract the interest of a large number of analysts, many small- and 
medium-sized stocks engage in disclosure strategies to “wake up” the investor base by 
increasing press coverage (Bushee and Miller, 2012). Moreover, a proactive approach in 
building investor relations and public communications are key attributes of small-and 
medium-sized stocks for increasing their institutional investors’ base and analyst following. 
In particular, the management tries to target the sophisticated institutional investors that have 
superior abilities to process and interpret the implications of public signals about growth 
prospects and therefore to enhance their potential for profitable trading opportunities (Kim 
and Verrecchia, 1994).  
At issue then is how to develop a measure that represents the extent to which such 
stocks are successful at communicating their growth prospects to such investors. A simple 
numerical count of firm disclosures might be a very noisy measure because a poor 
communicating firm might find it easier to replicate the number of disclosures of a company 
with a more effective communication strategy by simply releasing bland reports with little 
strategic information. In order to deal with this problem of potential costless mimicking, we 
propose that the news worthiness of any given corporate disclosure can be represented by 
how many times newswire services report on the original disclosure, such as Regulatory 
News Service (RNS) release.7 
Specifically, for each firm in our sample we obtain information from Factiva on the 
number of press release wires issued daily between January 2002 and December 2008. 
Overall newswire frequencies responding to a firm’s RNS release (disclosure) is our proxy 
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for the newsworthiness of corporate disclosures.8 For each firm we sum the number of all 
daily newswires in a quarter and construct a variable labelled WIRES.9 
 
  WIRES = the quarterly sum of the daily press release wires   
 
Next, separately for each group of firms (switching and non-switching)10 we develop a 
measure of the disclosure level, DIS, that is defined by the quintile rankings of sample 
observations based on the value of the variable WIRES by pooling overall quarter periods for 
that particular group of companies when making the quintile calculation. Observations within 
the lowest (highest) 20% of the variable WIRES are assigned the rank of 1 (5).11 
Panel A of Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the two groups of firms 
(switching and non-switching) by focusing on those firm observations that fall into the 
highest quintile of the disclosure rank (high disclosers). Columns 5 to 11 provide the results 
when we restrict our attention to the 170 AIM firms that switch from the SEAQ to SETSmm 
during the research period between 2002 and 2008. For this sample, following the 
introduction of the hybrid trading in the last quarter of 2005, the number of constituents 
increases monotonically except in the second and third quarters of 2008 and reaches its peak 
at the end of 2008 at 165 (see column 5). Turning the focus to listings of high disclosers 
(highest disclosure quintile), columns 6 and 7 show a relatively slow increase from 2002 to 
the third quarter of 2004. The number of high disclosers doubles between the third and the 
fourth quarter of 2004, and then again during 2005, a period that coincides with the 
preparation and introduction of the hybrid trading to AIM. The rise in the number of high 
disclosers’ continues as a steady trend (except in the second quarters of 2006 and 2007 
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respectively and in the first quarter of 2008) until reaching its peak at 68 (41.21% of the total 
number of constituents for the switching group) in the last quarter of 2008. Columns 8 to 11 
present the breakdown of the high disclosers’ constituents into quarters before and after 
individual firms’ move to the hybrid SETSmm protocol. In the quarter in which SETSmm is 
first introduced to AIM, almost half of the high disclosing firms (18 out of 39) have not yet 
moved from SEAQ. However, one year later (in the fourth quarter of 2006), the proportion of 
the high disclosers that have not switched to SETSmm dropped to a level of 21% (12 out of 
56), then in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 6% (4 out of 61), and finally during 2008 all firms 
that are high disclosers are also trading under the hybrid trading protocol.  
Compared to the switching (adopting) group, little variation is seen in the proportion 
of the high disclosers in the non-switching group (column 4) between the first quarter of 2002 
and the last quarter of 2008. For example, the fraction of the non-switching firms that are 
ranked as high disclosers at the beginning of the sample period (2002, first quarter) is 24%, 
but it is 28% at the end of the period (2008, last quarter) with little variation during the 
period. The corresponding percentages for the switching sample are 4% and 41% 
respectively. In addition, we compare the mean and median values of the quarterly disclosure 
intensity (WIRES) for the two groups of firms before and after the introduction of SETSmm 
in Panel B of Table 1. The analysis confirms similar patterns to those observed in Panel A. 
For example, for the switching group, the median (mean) WIRES12 increases from 9 (164.62) 
in periods before to 21 (255.55) in periods after the introduction of SETSmm; while for the 
non-switching group, WIRES increases from 9 (12.34) before to only 12 (18.19) after the 
fourth quarter of 200513.  Hence, the initial descriptive analysis is indicative of a link existing 
between high disclosure intensity (i.e. press newswire frequency in a quarter) and trading 
under a more transparent protocol.  
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
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In order to empirically test our predictions, we develop empirical models with which we 
examine the effects of the trading protocols and the varying levels of disclosure on the bid-
ask spreads after controlling for a number of other independent factors. Although Hypothesis 
1 focuses on the association between disclosure and the bid-ask spread conditional upon the 
type of trading protocol, we first assess the unconditional effects of disclosure and the type of 
trading, respectively, on the bid-ask spreads as a benchmark for our later tests and also to 
benchmark against prior studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) by fitting the following 
model to the switching sample:  
titititi CSETDISSpread ,,2,10, '   .     (1) 
The Spreadi,t is a quarterly median of the daily quoted bid-ask spreads measured at the end of 
each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-
point, DIS is a quintile ranking of the variable WIRES, SETi,t is a dummy variable defined to 
be one for the quarters after the firm’s switch to hybrid trading and zero otherwise, and C is 
the vector of the control variables. In selecting a set of control variables, we rely on the 
literature on cross-sectional determinants of stock liquidity (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; 
Daske et al., 2008; Amihud and Mendelson, 2008; Lang et al., 2012) that identify the size, 
dispersed ownership, financial leverage, profitability, financing needs, and the index 
inclusion as factors that influence the bid-ask spread and liquidity. For example, the higher 
the firm’s financial leverage, the greater the risk to its equity, which leads to greater 
sensitivity of its share price to new information about the firm. As a result of greater stock-
price sensitivity, the potential for informed investors to take advantage of less informed 
market makers and investors is greater. This advantage in turn leads to wider bid-ask spreads, 
increased volatility, and lower liquidity. Similarly, the greater the presence of inside 
shareholders, the greater potential for insiders to trade on the private information they have 
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about the firm, the greater the compensation required by less informed investors to cover for 
the risk of trading with more informed counterparties, and the wider the bid-ask spread is. We 
define size as a market value of equity (SIZE), ownership dispersion as the percentage of 
widely held shares (OWNERDIS), financial leverage as a ratio of the total financial debt to 
total assets (FLEV), profitability as a ratio of the operating income to total assets (ROA), and 
capital intensity as the proportion of long-term assets in total assets as a proxy for financing 
needs (CAPINT). We also add a dummy variable for the inclusion in the FTSE AIM UK 50 
index, because the constituents of the index are likely to have characteristics such as greater 
visibility and closer investor attention that directly affect the bid-ask spread. Following the 
established theoretical and empirical evidence on the association between the bid-ask spread 
and corporate disclosure (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), the coefficient on DIS is expected 
to be negative. In addition, discussion in Section 3.1 suggests that those firms that switch 
from the quote-driven to the hybrid type of trading protocol have significantly smaller 
spreads in the periods following their switch at an average level of disclosure; hence, the 
coefficient on SET is expected to be negative. However, the main concern of the present 
study is that the negative effects of hybrid trading on the bid-ask spread might not hold to the 
same extent across all growth stocks. For example, in a more transparent trading 
environment, some firms might see greater benefits from increasing their disclosure intensity 
that in turn further reduces their bid-ask spreads. As a result, the bid-ask spread cannot only 
be determined by adding the separate effects of disclosure and the trading protocol, but 
instead the two determining factors are likely to interact with each other and provide a 
reinforcing or multiplicative effect on the bid-ask spread.  Hence, the key issue here is to 
empirically investigate the interactive effect between disclosure and the type of trading on the 
bid-ask spread. With this in mind, we extend the model to assess the interaction between DIS 
and SET:  
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titititititi CSETDISSETDISSpread ,,,3,2,10, '*      (2) 
The interaction coefficient on DISi,t*SETi,t measures the incremental effect of both 
high disclosure and more transparent trading. If the two variables reinforce each other, then 
we expect to observe a double transparency effect on the bid-ask spread – not only are trades 
more transparent but firms also see greater benefits from disclosing more information about 
their activities (Hypothesis H1). In this case, the coefficient on DISi,t*SETi,t should be 
significantly negative. In other words, the sum of the coefficients on DISi,t, SETi,t, and 
DISi,t*SETi,t should be significantly smaller than the sum of the coefficients on DISi,t and 
SETi,t14. If this is the case, then the effects of transparency of trading and disclosure intensity 
are complementary.  
Next, in order to further check inferences regarding the association between trading 
and the disclosure intensity, we add a non-switching group of firms to the analysis and 
address two important issues.15 First, we test whether the extent at which disclosure impacts 
the bid-ask spread is the same for the switching and non-switching groups in the periods 
before the introduction of SETSmm to AIM. We re-estimate model (2) for the two classes of 
firms and compare the coefficients on DIS. We predict that the difference in the coefficients 
should not be significant.16 Second, we check whether the association between disclosure and 
the bid-ask spread might be driven by firm characteristics inherent to the life-cycle stage of 
the individual firm, instead of the type of trading. Hence, for the non-switching group, we 
now re-estimate model (2) by substituting variable SETi,t with a new dummy variable POSTi,t 
that takes the value of one for quarters following the introduction of SETSmm (last quarter of 
2005) and zero otherwise: 
titititititi CPOSTDISPOSTDISSpread ,,,3,2,10, '*     (2a) 
15 
 
We compare the impact of disclosure on the bid-ask spread between the periods before and 
after SETSmm introduction, and predict that for non-adopters, there should not be a 
significantly incremental effect for disclosure on the bid-ask spread in the periods following 
the introduction of SETSmm relative to the periods before for the non-switching sample. In 
this case, the coefficient on DISi,t*POSTi,t should not be significantly different from zero. 
When empirically assessing the association between voluntary disclosure and the bid-
ask spread, we need to recognize that endogeneity might be an issue, because firms can 
choose to improve their disclosures for reasons that could also affect the spread directly. The 
endogenous nature of disclosure has been well documented by both economic theory and 
empirical research (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005; Cohen, 2008; 
Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Clinch and Verrecchia, 2011; Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal, 
2011). These studies argue that there might be unobservable firm characteristics that affect 
both disclosure and the bid-ask spread that could lead to a spurious association between the 
two variables. For example, if better disclosure results in lower information asymmetry 
among investors, which in turn reduces the bid-ask spread, then thinly traded, high 
information asymmetry firms that wish to improve their stock liquidity and to lower their bid-
ask spread might have greater incentives to make more voluntary disclosures. As a result, the 
disclosure variable could be endogenously determined within the model that attempts to 
estimate the relation between the bid-ask spread and the disclosure intensity. We address this 
important concern in two ways. First, in order to control for the unobservable firm-specific 
characteristics we use fixed effects in both models (1) and (2) and report both OLS and fixed 
effects models’ results, with the emphasis on the latter. Second, in subsection 5.4 we address 
the endogenous nature of the relation between disclosure and the bid-ask spread, and check 
the validity of the OLS against the approach with instrumental variables (2SLS).   
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4.3. Data Description 
To perform our analyses, we obtain the financial data from Worldscope, the stocks prices and 
the number of shares outstanding from Datastream, and the listings of the AIM stocks and 
AIM50 index constituencies from the London Stock Exchange. Panel C of Table 1 reports 
descriptive statistics for the switching group over the whole research period (columns 1 to 6) 
and for quarters before and after the firm’s switch from SEAQ to SETSmm respectively 
(columns 7 to 9). The findings presented in Panel C indicate that a typical switching AIM 
firm has a market capitalization of approximately 95 million British pounds, is weakly 
leveraged with less than 4% of debt to total assets ratio, and with somewhat concentrated 
ownership (with a median dispersed ownership figure at a level of 66% of total 
shareholdings). In terms of the all-newswire frequencies, we find a positively skewed 
distribution of the variable WIRES (the median and the mean are 16 and 222 respectively) 
that indicates that the majority of the observed firms have a relatively small frequency of 
press-release newswires in a quarter, but the bulk of the firms with a high quarterly frequency 
of press-release newswires is concentrated in the 90th percentile of the variable WIRES17. The 
descriptive statistics for the two distinct periods before and after switching to the hybrid 
trading discloses several patterns in the data. After having moved to SETSmm, firms tend to 
be bigger in size, more profitable, with more dispersed ownership, and greater disclosure 
relative to firms that have not yet switched to the hybrid trading system. 
Panel D of Table 1 sets out the descriptive statistics for the non-switching sample 
(non-adopters). The findings presented in Panel D indicate that a typical non-switching AIM 
firm has a market capitalization of approximately 41 million British pounds, with a debt to 
total assets ratio of approximately 6%, and with a median dispersed ownership at 62% of the 
total shareholdings. Variables SIZE, ROA, OWNERDIS, and CAPINT are all calculated on a 
quarterly basis during the research period from January 2002 to December 2008. 
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5.  Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
We start our empirical analyses for the switching sample with a univariate comparison of the 
bid-ask spreads across the high and low disclosers before and after the quarter in which a 
particular firm switches from SEAQ to SETSmm by using a difference-in-difference design. 
This simple approach allows us to take into account the variation in the mean spreads 
between the high and low disclosers in the quarters before and in the quarters after the switch 
to SETSmm and to compare the relative changes over time. Table 2 reports the results. We 
find that the high disclosers have significantly lower mean spreads compared to low 
disclosers both in quarters before (0.04656 versus 0.08179) and after the switch (0.02272 
versus 0.03938). However, the decrease in spread between the pre- and post-switch quarters 
is significantly larger (by around 2%) for the low disclosers than for the high disclosers. In 
other words, the high disclosers that have not switched yet exhibit a higher mean spread than 
low disclosers that have already switched (0.04656 vs. 0.03938). These initial findings show 
that when restricting attention to the sample of pre-switch high disclosers, both before and 
after their opportunity to switch to SETSmm, this sample exhibits significantly higher bid-ask 
spreads when trading under the traditional market maker quote based system as compared to 
when they trade under SETSmm.  In order words, despite high-disclosure intensity, firms do 
not appear to achieve desired benefits in terms of spread reduction if they remain on a quote-
driven trading system. 
5.2. Multivariate Analysis Results 
We continue the empirical analysis by estimating the regression equation (1) that models 
unconditional effects of disclosure and the type of trading respectively on the bid-ask spread. 
We report the OLS estimates and correct the standard errors for within-firm correlations in 
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column 1 of Table 3. The results show a significant unconditional negative relation between 
disclosure and SPREAD (DIS = -0.090, p-value < 0.001). This is consistent with the 
literature of the effect of disclosure on the capital markets (e.g., Daske et al., 2008). The 
coefficient on SET is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level (SET = -0.387, p-
value < 0.001).  
This result is in line with our baseline prediction discussed in Section 3.1  that bid-ask 
spreads are significantly smaller in periods ‘after’ compared to the periods ‘before’ switching 
from the quote-driven to the hybrid type of trading at an average level of disclosure 
In column 2 of Table 3, we add firm fixed effects in order to control for unobservable 
firm-specific characteristics. The results from column 2 are consistent with those in column 
1, that is, the coefficients on DIS and SET are negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (DIS= -0.052, p-value < 0.001; SET= -0.254, p-value < 0.001). This significance 
suggests that the negative associations between disclosure spread, and the type of trading, 
respectively, are not driven by omitted firm-specific factors.   
Next, we replicate the analysis by using an alternative measure of liquidity instead of 
the bid-ask spread: the price impact of trades (PRIMPACT) that captures the ability of 
investors to trade in a share without moving its price. The impact is measured as the ratio of 
the absolute daily stock return to the British pound value of the daily stock trading volume18 
(Amihud, 2002). The ratio assesses liquidity costs or market illiquidity for a particular stock, 
that is, the trading volume needed to move the stock price. The higher the ratio, the less liquid 
the stock is. We calculate quarterly medians of the daily ratios. We expect that greater 
disclosure and more transparent trading, respectively, will result in a greater ability for 
investors to trade with less of a price impact and with a lower stock illiquidity. Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 3 report the results for PRIMPACT. The results from the OLS specification 
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are in column 3, while column 4 reports the results after adding the firm fixed effects. The 
results from both types of specifications confirm the negative association between illiquidity, 
disclosure, and the type of trading respectively. For example, the coefficient on DIS in the 
fixed effects specification in column 4 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while the coefficient on SET is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Overall, because the results for PRIMPACT confirm those for SPREAD, we conclude 
that illiquidity decreases with disclosure and more transparent trading, respectively. 
5.3 Interaction Effects 
The results obtained thus far indicate that the greater transparency of the hybrid trading 
relative to the quote-driven trading protocol results in significantly lower spreads and 
improved stock liquidity. In addition, the results confirm the well-documented (e.g., Daske et 
al., 2008) concept that increased disclosure efforts lead to lower bid-ask spreads and better 
stock liquidity. Here, we argue that the negative effect of disclosure on the bid-ask spread is 
likely to be reinforced by the type of trading. In other words, not only that trading under the 
more transparent protocol results in lower bid-ask spreads, but also firms see greater benefits 
from disclosing more information to the market. Hence, we hypothesise that the bid-ask 
spread will be determined by an interactive or multiplicative effect of disclosure and the type 
of trading. Thus, we estimate model (2) to assess the conditional effect of disclosure and the 
type of trading on the bid-ask spread and liquidity.  
Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table 4 report the results for the bid-ask spread. Column 1 
shows the results of an OLS specification and in column 2 we re-estimate model (2) with firm 
fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is DISi,t*SETi,t. While the coefficient from the OLS 
specification is negative and significant at the 10% level (-0.079, p-value < 0.010), after 
adding firm effects the coefficient increases both in magnitude and statistical significance (-
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0.112, p-value < 0.001). This result suggests that the omitted unobservable firm 
characteristics are likely to affect the manner in which disclosure and the type of trading 
interact with each other, and the manner in which they jointly impact the bid-ask spread19. 
Looking at the separate effects of disclosure and the type of trading on SPREAD, we find that 
the coefficients on DIS are statistically non-significant both for the OLS and for the fixed 
effects specifications. The non-significant coefficient on DIS indicates that increased 
disclosure efforts by firms in periods before their switch to the more transparent trading 
protocol do not result in significantly improved bid-ask spreads.20. The coefficients on SET 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications of the model (2) 
implying that switching the trading protocol reduces the SPREAD at an average level of 
disclosure.  Jointly, the findings indicate that the desired reductions in the spread by means of 
disclosure are achieved only if firms improve their disclosure activities in conjunction with 
switching to the more transparent trading system.21  
These findings provide empirical support for Hypothesis H1 that the association 
between disclosure and the bid-ask spread is reinforced by the type of trading protocol22. This 
reinforcement is demonstrated clearly in Figure 1. For example, for firms from the lowest 
quintile of disclosure, the spreads before and after firms’ switching, are in fact quite similar. 
On the other hand, the difference in spreads between the two periods increases with the level 
of disclosure that indicates the stronger degree of association between disclosure and the bid-
ask spread in periods after compared to periods before the switch (see the steeper negative 
slope for “adopters after switch” relative to the slope for “adopters before switch”).  
To assess the validity of our disclosure measure, we re-estimate model (2) using the 
(company) RNS release wires instead of all (sources) newswires when computing the 
disclosure variables WIRES and the corresponding quintile ranking DIS. Columns 3 and 4 
report the results from the re-estimated model that uses the OLS and the fixed effect 
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specifications respectively. The results are similar in magnitude and significance to those in 
columns 1 and 2. In particular, after controlling for firm fixed effects, the differential 
coefficient on DISi,t*SETi,t   is negative and significant at the 1% level (-0.111, p-value < 
0.001) that confirms the interacting effects between the disclosure intensity and the hybrid 
type of trading23.  
In columns 5 and 6, we replicate our analysis in columns 1 and 2 after replacing the 
dependent variable with PRIMPACT. The results in columns 5 (OLS specification) and 6 
(including fixed effects) confirm the negative effect of the interaction between disclosure and 
the trading on the bid-ask spread (coefficients on DISi,t*SETi,t   are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level). In addition, the coefficients on DIS and SET are positive and 
significant at the 5% level and better in the OLS and fixed effects specifications. The positive 
and significant coefficients on DIS suggest that illiquidity increases with disclosure in periods 
before switching to SETSmm.24 However, this positive effect is reversed in periods after 
switching, as indicated by the estimate for the combined effect of disclosure and trading of -
0.092 (i.e., 0.096 – 0.188) for the fixed effects specification.25 In this case, the inference is 
that firms might accrue benefits from increased disclosure intensity, in terms of better 
liquidity, provided that they trade in the transparent trading protocol. The positive and 
significant coefficients on SET imply that hybrid trading increases PRIMPACT, thus 
reducing liquidity. This decrease in liquidity is consistent with the literature on market 
microstructure (Theissen, 2003) that documents that TTGS might experience strong price 
impacts as a result of moving from non-anonymous “upstairs” dealers to an anonymous 
“downstairs” market, especially if the trades are large, which is typical of institutional 
investors’ trading. 
We have already argued the importance of the trading protocol for reducing the bid-
ask spread and the illiquidity can differ between the high- and low-intensity disclosers. The 
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analysis of the coefficients on SET and DIS*SET provides support for the argument, given 
that the positive effect of the hybrid trading on illiquidity is significantly lower for high-
intensity disclosers (the coefficients on DIS*SET are negative and significant in both 
specifications of the model) that implies that disclosure exerts the corrective influence on the 
positive association between the hybrid trading and PRIMPACT.  
Based on these results, we infer that liquidity is significantly greater for the high 
relative to low disclosers in periods after compared to the periods before switching from the 
quote driven to the hybrid type of trading. This finding provides further empirical support for 
Hypothesis H1.  
5.3.1. Analysis of Disclosure Improvements   
An important related question is, whether in periods before switching to the hybrid 
type of trading, the benefits of increased disclosure (in terms of its impact on spread and 
liquidity)  are too marginal to motivate firms to improve their disclosure levels.  In other 
words, if in certain markets (such as in quote driven market segments), TTGS do not 
experience benefits from increased disclosure efforts, or the benefits are too marginal, then 
the concern is whether these companies do not improve their disclosure levels because the 
trading system prevents them from harvesting the benefits of increased disclosure activities.  
To address this question, we carry out the following empirical analysis. We construct a 
balanced subsample by matching observations by disclosure rank and size across the two 
periods (pre and post switching to SETSmm), so that the disclosure distributions are 
comparable before and after the switch.  Using this ‘matched subsample’ we split the 
observations into those with positive and negative changes in the quarterly press release wires 
(WIRES).  We then examine the extent at which positive ‘changes’ in WIRES (+WIRES) 
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affect the changes in spread ( SPREAD) before and after switching to SETSmm by fitting a 
modified version of model (2): 
 
titititititi CSETWIRESSETWIRESSpread ,,,3,2,10, '*      (3) 
 
We compute variable WIRES using the RNS release wires as well as all newswires.  
If the benefit of increased disclosure on spread does not exist or it is too marginal before 
switching to SETSmm then the coefficient on +WIRES should be statistically insignificant. 
If the benefit on spread significantly increases after switching then the coefficient on the 
interaction variable +WIRES*SET should be negative. The results are reported in Panel A 
of Table 5. The coefficient estimates on +WIRES are insignificant while the coefficients on 
+WIRES*SET are significantly negative both in the OLS (Columns 1 and 3) and in the 
fixed effect models (Columns 2 and 4) and for the both specifications of the WIRES variable 
(all newswires and RNS), indicating that an equivalent increase in disclosure results in 
significantly larger impact on spread in the post- relative to the pre-switching period, 
controlling for other factors. In other words, these findings suggest that the threshold at which 
an increase in WIRES becomes beneficial in terms of its negative impact on the spread 
lowers after switching to SETSmm.  
If this is the case then after switching, firms should be more motivated to increase their 
disclosure levels and we should observe a higher frequency of improvements in disclosure 
levels in the post- relative to the pre-switching period. We relax the requirement for constant 
disclosure distributions in a pre- versus post-switch period and using the full sample of 
observations26 we check the frequency of disclosure improvements across the two periods. 
Disclosure improvements are defined as positive quarterly changes in the two specifications 
of variable WIRES (RNS and all newswires). As expected, we find (Panel B of Table 5) 
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higher frequency of disclosure increases in periods ‘after’ relative to periods ‘before’ 
switching to SETSmm. This result corroborates our original descriptive statistics results 
(reported in Table 1) which show greater disclosure levels ‘after’ relative to ‘before’ 
switching (Panel C of Table 1) and also results reported in Panel A of Table 1 which show an 
increasing number of high disclosing firms in quarters after switching to SETSmm.  
 
5.3.2. Analysis for Non-adopters  
The analysis is continued by estimating model (2a) for the non-switching group, that is, the 
firms that continue to trade under the quote-driven system after the introduction of SETSmm 
to AIM (non-adopters). 
We report the results in Table 6. We use firm fixed effects to address the concern that 
disclosure is endogenous due to omitted firm characteristics. To economize on space, we do 
not report the OLS specification of the model as the results are very similar. In column 1 we 
analyse the relation between disclosure and the bid-ask spread in periods before and after the 
introduction of SETSmm. One purpose of this analysis is to test whether the extent to which 
disclosure impacts spread, is the same for the switching and non-switching groups in periods 
before the introduction of SETSmm. We re-estimate model (2a) for the switching group and 
compare the coefficients on DIS between the two groups of firms by using the seemingly 
unrelated regression models.27 We find that the effect of disclosure on the bid-ask spread for 
the non-switching group is not significantly different from the corresponding effect for the 
switching group.28 In column 2 we replicate the analysis in column 1 after replacing the 
dependant variable with PRIMPACT. The results confirm those reported for SPREAD in 
column 1 (i.e., the difference in coefficients on DIS between non-adopters and adopters is not 
statistically significant). Another purpose of the analysis is to investigate whether the 
association between disclosure and the bid-ask spread might be driven by firm characteristics 
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inherent to the life-cycle stage of an individual firm instead of the type of trading system. We 
compare the impact of disclosure on the bid-ask spread between the periods before and after 
SETSmm introduction, and find no significant incremental effect of disclosure on the bid-ask 
spread in the period following SETSmm introduction (i.e., the coefficient on DISi,t*POSTi,t is 
not significantly different from zero). Column 2 of Table 6 reports the results for PRIMPACT 
that confirm this finding29.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the predictions discussed in Section 3.1 
concerning the association between disclosure and bid ask spread for non-adopters relative to 
adopters.   
Figure 2 clearly illustrates these findings. The similarity in the degree at which 
disclosure affects the bid-ask spread between non-adopters and adopters in periods before is 
reflected in similar slopes for the “non-adopters before 2005q4”and for the “adopters before 
the switch.”  
Moreover, when we compare the slopes before and after for the two groups of firms 
(non-adopters versus adopters), the incremental effect of disclosure is evident only for the 
“adopters group – after the switch.”30 
5.4. Endogeneity Controls 
The purpose of this section is to address the concern with regard to the potential endogeneity 
bias pertinent to models with disclosure and the bid-ask spread as a response variable. In 
particular, if disclosure is endogenously determined by factors that also affect the bid-ask 
spread, then the OLS coefficients 1 and (1+3) in models (1) and (2) that capture the 
impact of disclosure on SPREAD before and after switching to SETSmm, respectively, will 
be biased.31 One approach to address the endogenous relation between DIS and SPREAD is 
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to estimate a two-stage structural equation model (2SLS) that instruments DIS in the first 
stage with a set of exogenously determined variables (see Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The 
key issue here is to choose the appropriate instrumental (exogenous) variables that explain 
disclosure but that are uncorrelated with SPREAD except through the variables controlled for 
(Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). In choosing instrumental variables, other studies (e.g., Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000; Balakrishnan et al., 2011) rely on the empirical evidence (e.g., Lang 
and Lunhdolm, 1993; Ahmed and Curtis, 1999; Hail, 2002; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007) with 
regard to the cross-sectional determinants of corporate disclosure and select firm-specific 
factors such as ownership dispersion, firm performance, analysts’ coverage, and financing 
needs as suitable exogenous instruments (exclusion restrictions). However, our results so far 
indicate the factors that are arguably correlated with disclosure are firm-specific 
characteristics that also affect the bid-ask spread directly. Hence, our approach is to identify a 
variable(s) that the literature has not yet considered as an exclusion restriction in reduced-
form spread regressions. Towards this goal, we use a method that examines the dynamics 
with which potential instruments affect disclosure and spread respectively (see Balakrishnan 
et al., 2011). In particular, we investigate the timeline within which disclosure and spread 
respond to TTGS financial performance. 
For the type of TTGS that list on AIM, financial performance is often highly 
dependent on the success of one or two highly uncertain projects. For instance, during our 
sample period, a significant number of “extractive industries” are TTGS, such as oil and other 
mining exploration companies. For these “one big project companies” financial performance 
typically does not evolve smoothly – there might be a number of periods of little or no results 
reported followed by a “shock” success or failure reported if the company hits it big with an 
exploration well or finds nothing after incurring significant costs.  
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We conjecture that positive reports on financial performance decrease the bid-ask 
spread contemporaneously as this reflects TTGS’ ability to demonstrate realized rather than 
just promised growth potential. We then investigate whether this decrease in the bid-ask 
spread is sustained for periods beyond one quarter, and find that while financial performance 
is associated with a significant decrease in the bid-ask spread contemporaneously, this 
decrease in the spread does not persist beyond the concurrent quarter. In other words, we find 
that the lagged performance (in quarters t= -2 and t=-1) does not affect spread in quarter t=0.   
Next, following the research (e.g., Skinner, 1997) that firms might strategically vary the 
timing of voluntary disclosures, we test to see if TTGS change their disclosure intensity in a 
timely and sustainable way in response to shocks in project results. We find that TTGS 
respond to financial performance by changing the frequency of their disclosures and that 
these changes take effect for a period of beyond one quarter. In other words, disclosure is 
correlated with contemporaneous (in quarter t= 0) and lagged performance (in quarters t= - 2 
and t= - 1) measures. Those patterns suggest that while contemporaneous performance 
violates the exclusion restriction, and thus is not suitable for instrumenting disclosure, the 
lagged performance measures have the potential to be valid instruments for our disclosure 
variable. The empirical tests that assess the impact of lagged (in addition to 
contemporaneous) performance measures on the bid-ask spread are explained in the 
Appendix.  
Having established that the prior period’s performance can act as a valid instrumental 
variable, we re-estimate model (1) for the adopters’ sample with the 2SLS technique where 
we instrument the disclosure variable DIS by using the lagged values of the performance 
proxy ROA. We do not use the 2SLS approach for model (2), because we do not have a 
suitable instrument for the interaction variable DISi,t*SETi,t.32 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 
report the results from the first- and second-stage (reduced form) regressions respectively. 
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Compared to the results from columns 1 (OLS specification) and 2 (fixed effects 
specification) in Table 3, the coefficient on DIS in column 2 is no longer statistically 
significant; but the coefficients on all other explanatory variables are consistent in 
magnitudes and statistical significance (except for the coefficients on OWNERDIS and 
VOLAT that are now significant at the 5% level or better). We perform a set of diagnostic 
tests in order to compare the instrumental variables method with the OLS approach. First, we 
assess the strength of the instruments.33 The R-squared of the first-stage regression is 22.6%, 
while the partial R-squared and a partial F-statistic for the joint significance of the 
coefficients on instrumental variables are 0.5% and 2.34 respectively (with a p-value = 
0.0970).  Second, we test the exogeneity of the instruments. We perform a test of over-
identifying restrictions that accepts the hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments (Chi2 
is 0.108 with a p-value = 0.7428).34 Finally, using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we test the 
null hypothesis that the OLS is an appropriate estimation technique, (i.e., the null hypothesis 
is that DIS is exogenous). The test accepts the null hypothesis (F = 0.581, p-value = 0.4460) 
of the appropriateness of the OLS compared to the 2SLS technique. The tests carried out here 
confirm the validity of the method approach used to obtain the findings reported in Table 3, 
and more importantly in Tables 4, 5 and 6 that provide empirical evidence that the extent to 
which disclosure intensity affects the bid-ask spread and liquidity varies across the two types 
of trading protocols.  
6.  Conclusion 
 
When the management of thinly traded growth stocks consider increasing the intensity of 
voluntary disclosures in order to attract additional investors, the success of such efforts 
depends on the specific market microstructure under which the stock is traded. Under some 
trading protocols, collusive behaviour by market makers can significantly reduce the potential 
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gains when companies are considering increasing disclosure intensity. That is, the potential 
benefits from disclosure cannot be appraised separately without taking account of the chosen 
trading microstructure. In this research, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis that 
a hybrid trading protocol can provide greater incentives for management to increase 
disclosure. We show how AIM stocks that switched to SETSmm hybrid trading system saw 
significant incremental benefits from being high disclosers, but for the stocks that did not 
switch the benefits from high disclosure were muted, as Figure 1 illustrates. For TTGS when 
there is a switch from quote to hybrid market microstructure, we show that there is a 
significant negative impact on bid-ask spread. This finding implies that the threshold at which 
a marginal increase in disclosure becomes beneficial (in terms of impact on spread) is 
lowered.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics for non-adopters and adopters across quarters 
Quarter 
Non-
adopters - 
total 
Non-adopter firms - High 
disclosers   Adopters 
listings - 
total 
Adopter firms - High 
disclosers  
Adopters - High 
disclosers before their 
switch to SETSmm 
Adopters - High 
disclosers after their 
switch to SETSmm 
  
Number 
% (of the 
total non- 
adopters 
listings) 
Number 
% (of the 
total adopters 
listings) 
Number 
% (of the 
total 
adopters 
listings) 
Number 
% (of the 
total 
adopters 
listings) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2002q1 54 13 24.07 49 2 4.08 2 4.08 
2002q2 54 10 18.52 51 2 3.92 2 3.92 
2002q3 56 11 19.64 56 2 3.57 2 3.57 
2002q4 57 13 22.81 57 2 3.51 2 3.51 
2003q1 57 13 22.81 57 6 10.53 6 10.53 
2003q2 57 11 19.30 58 6 10.34 6 10.34 
2003q3 57 11 19.30 56 5 8.93 5 8.93 
2003q4 60 8 13.33 59 5 8.47 5 8.47 
2004q1 62 7 11.29 64 4 6.25 4 6.25 
2004q2 63 12 19.05 70 8 11.43 8 11.43 
2004q3 66 17 25.76 79 9 11.39 9 11.39 
2004q4 71 13 18.31 89 18 20.22 18 20.22 
2005q1 82 12 14.63 100 19 19.00 19 19 
2005q2 87 16 18.39 105 33 31.43 33 31.43 
2005q3 96 20 20.83 117 33 28.21 33 28.21 
2005q4 104 26 25.00 124 39 31.45 18 14.52 21 16.94 
2006q1 114 28 24.56 130 42 32.31 16 12.31 26 20 
2006q2 114 23 20.18 131 34 25.95 13 9.92 21 16.03 
2006q3 114 30 26.32 146 45 30.82 13 8.9 32 21.92 
2006q4 114 31 27.19 153 56 36.60 12 7.84 44 28.76 
2007q1 114 40 35.09 156 60 38.46 11 7.05 49 31.41 
2007q2 114 40 35.09 157 55 35.03 3 1.91 52 33.12 
2007q3 114 41 35.96 158 58 36.71 7 4.43 51 32.28 
2007q4 114 44 38.60 162 61 37.65 4 2.47 57 35.19 
2008q1 114 31 27.19 164 56 34.15 56 34.15 
2008q2 114 32 28.07 163 59 36.20 59 36.2 
2008q3 114 28 24.56 163 60 36.81 60 36.81 
2008q4 114 32 28.07 165 68 41.21 68 41.21 
Total 2,451     3,039             
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Panel B: Disclosure intensity for adopters versus non-adopters in periods before and after the introduction of SETSmm 
 
 
  Adopters   Non Adopters 
Wires (all newswires) Wires (RNS)   Wires (all newswires) Wires (RNS) 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
Before 2005q4 1,126 164.62 9 1,126 31.21 5 1,088 12.34 9 1,088 4.16 3 
After 2005q4 1,960 255.55 21 1,960 68.17 8 1,456 18.19 12 1,456 7.22 5 
Total 3,086 222.37 16 3,086 54.68 6 2,544 15.69 11 2,544 5.91 4 
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Panel C: Distribution of variables and correlation matrix - adopters 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Before switching After switching Before- vs. After-switching 
 Number Mean Std.Dev P10 Median P90 Number Mean Number Mean Difference (8 - 10) p-value 
SIZE 2,914 175,415 320,906 11,657 95,886 347,072 1,347 105,315 1,567 235,674 -130,359 0.0000 
OWNERDIS 2,052 0.6291 0.4780 0.3297 0.6615 0.9847 845 0.5848 1,207 0.6601 -0.0753 0.0004 
ROA 2,282 -0.0141 0.1124 -0.0743 0.0065 0.0424 1,011 -0.0254 1,271 -0.0051 -0.0202 0.0000 
CAPINTENS 2,356 0.2271 0.2716 0.0067 0.1040 0.6758 1,130 0.2234 1,226 0.2305 -0.0070 0.5297 
FLEV 2,368 0.1420 0.2783 0 0.0381 0.3778 1,135 0.1321 1,233 0.1511 -0.0190 0.0968 
GROWTH 1,824 1.1096 4.1644 -0.1687 0.2353 1.8850 716 1.5335 1,108 0.8357 0.6978 0.0005 
WIRES (All 
newswires) 3,086 222.37 1,141.16 3 16 93 1,492 151.78 1,594 288.44 -136.6569 0.0009 
WIRES (RNS) 3,086 54.68 281.80 1 6 24 1,492 30.71 1,594 77.13 -46.42038 0.0000 
SPREAD 2,894 0.0460 0.0571 0.0082 0.0306 0.0952 1,363 0.0622 1,531 0.0315 0.0307 0.0000 
PRIMPACT 2,941 0.0062 0.1487 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 1,403 0.0048 1,538 0.0076 -0.0028 0.6067 
ZERORET 2,999 0.3531 0.2688 0.0615 0.2879 0.7538 1,408 0.4973 1,591 0.2256 0.2717 0.0000 
VOLAT 3,006 0.0321 0.0549 0.0093 0.0243 0.0577 1,412 0.0289 1,594 0.0349 -0.0061 0.0025 
VOLUME 2,941 0.0041 0.0061 0.0005 0.0025 0.0087 1,403 0.0041 1,538 0.0041 0.0001 0.7049 
AIM50 3,086 0.2074 0.4055 0 0 1 1,492 0.2011 1,594 0.2133 -0.0122 0.4026 
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WIRES 
(All 
newswires) 
WIRES 
(RNS) SPREAD PRIMPACT VOLAT SIZE OWNERDIS ROA CAPINTENS FLEV VOLUME AIM50 SET 
                                                  
WIRES (All 
newswires) 1.000 
WIRES 
(RNS) 0.987 # 1.000 
SPREAD -0.050 # -0.058 # 1.000 
PRIMPACT -0.004 -0.004 0.054 # 1.000 
VOLAT 0.018 0.018 0.127 # 0.038 # 1.000 
SIZE 0.120 # 0.124 # -0.169 # -0.023 0.083 # 1.000 
OWNERDIS 0.053 # 0.056 # -0.111 # 0.023 -0.036 
-
0.014 1.000 
ROA 0.032 0.037 -0.275 # 0.007 -0.159 # 0.000 0.056 # 1.000 
CAPINTENS -0.080 # -0.092 # -0.061 # -0.007 -0.044 # 0.078 # 0.045 # 0.023 1.000 
FLEV -0.044 # -0.043 # 0.024 0.008 0.020 0.031 0.039 -0.515 # 0.257 # 1.000 
VOLUME 0.007 -0.003 -0.076 # -0.023 0.074 # 
-
0.047 # 0.102 # -0.017 -0.008 0.034 1.000 
AIM50 0.036 # 0.005 -0.190 # 0.019 -0.042 # 0.322 # 0.003 0.122 # 0.157 # -0.040 0.048 # 1.000 
SET 0.060 # 0.043 # -0.269 # 0.010 0.055 # 0.203 # 0.078 # 0.089 # 0.013 0.034 -0.007 0.015 1.000 
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Panel D: Distribution of variables and correlation matrix – non-adopters 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Before 2005q4 After 2005q4 
Before- vs. After- 
2005q4 
Number Mean Std.Dev P10 Median P90 Number Mean Number Mean Difference (8 - 10) p-value 
SIZE 2,411 82,079 308,524 8,919 41,237 109,916 965 78,344 1,446 84,572 -6,228.64 0.6273 
OWNERDIS 1,826 0.6241 0.4200 0.3379 0.6176 0.9858 563 0.6124 1,263 0.6294 -0.0171 0.4230 
ROA 2,025 -0.0130 0.0920 -0.0827 0.0060 0.0468 733 -0.0254 1,292 -0.0060 -0.0194 0.0000 
CAPINTENS 2,126 0.2203 0.2479 0.0081 0.1105 0.6275 838 0.2142 1,288 0.2242 -0.0101 0.3601 
FLEV 2,144 0.1243 0.1713 0.0000 0.0566 0.3358 846 0.0941 1,298 0.1440 -0.0499 0.0000 
WIRES (All 
newswires) 2,544 15.69 17.67 3.00 11.00 31.00 1,088 12.3364 1,456 18.1923 -5.8559 0.0000 
WIRES (RNS) 2,544 5.91 7.72 1 4.00 12.00 1,088 4.1572 1,456 7.2246 -3.0674 0.0000 
SPREAD 2,415 0.0630 0.0635 0.0218 0.0455 0.1200 970 0.0768 1,445 0.0537 0.0231 0.0000 
PRIMPACT 2,459 0.0032 0.0532 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 1,006 0.0075 1,453 0.0002 0.0073 0.0008 
ZERORET 2,462 0.5175 0.2469 0.1385 0.5469 0.8182 1,006 0.5349 1,456 0.5055 0.0294 0.0037 
VOLAT 2,462 0.0277 0.0229 0.0087 0.0216 0.0510 1,006 0.0300 1,456 0.0261 0.0039 0.0000 
VOLUME 2,459 0.0026 0.0039 0.0004 0.0016 0.0056 1,006 0.0027 1,453 0.0025 0.0002 0.1885 
AIM50 2,544 0.0366 0.1877 0 0 0 1,088 0.0441 1,456 0.0309 0.0132 0.0790 
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WIRES 
(All 
newswires) 
WIRES 
(RNS) SPREAD PRIMPACT VOLAT SIZE OWNERDIS ROA CAPINTENS FLEV VOLUME AIM50 
WIRES (All 
newswires) 1.000 
WIRES (RNS) 0.610 # 1.000 
SPREAD -0.098 # -0.072 # 1.000 
PRIMPACT -0.037 -0.035 0.133 # 1.000 
VOLAT 0.181 # 0.054 # 0.338 # 0.235 # 1.000 
SIZE 0.040 # 0.042 # -0.017 -0.015 0.037 1.000 
OWNERDIS 0.056 # 0.035 -0.021 -0.012 0.044 0.012 1.000 
ROA -0.040 -0.053 # -0.225 # 0.010 
-
0.232 # -0.029 -0.026 1.000 
CAPINTENS -0.014 -0.028 -0.081 # 0.082 # 
-
0.017 0.013 -0.109 # 0.152 # 1.000 
FLEV 0.026 0.026 0.032 -0.028 
-
0.001 -0.034 -0.029 -0.017 0.194 # 1.000 
VOLUME 0.185 # 0.131 # -0.062 # -0.037 0.298 # -0.066 # 0.092 # -0.130 # -0.074 # 0.000 1.000 
AIM50 0.180 # 0.108 # -0.056 # -0.012 
-
0.020 0.099 # 0.010 0.029 0.057 # 0.038   0.001   1.000 
 
Notes:  Panel A shows the total number of AIM listings for which the data on press release newswire frequency is obtainable from Factiva between 2002 and 2008. Adopters 
are companies that switched from the SEAQ to SETSmm trading system during the research period. Non-adopters are firms that trade on the SEAQ only. The sample consists 
of a maximum of 3,086 (2,544) observations from 170 (114) firms during 28 quarters from January 2002 to December 2008 for Adopters (Non-adopters). High disclosers are 
observations falling into the fifth quintile of the variable WIRES. The WIRES is a quarterly sum of all the daily press release newswires calculated for each firm.  Sub-columns 
labelled “Number” report the number of listings for each quarter for a particular category from that column.  Sub-columns labelled “%” report the number of listings for that 
category as a percentage of the total number of listings for each quarter. Panel B compares the disclosure intensity measured by the variable WIRES between Adopters and 
Non-adopters in periods before and after the introduction of the hybrid trading system to AIM. Variable is WIRES is computed using two methods: (1) as the quarterly sum of 
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all daily news wires and, (2) as the quarterly sum of daily RNS wires. Panels C, and D report the distribution of the variables used in the analyses and their correlations for 
Adopters and Non-adopters respectively. The SIZE is the market value of equity. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held shares. The ROA is calculated 
as the ratio of operating income to total assets.  The CAPINT is the proportion of long-term assets in total assets. The FLEV is the ratio of total financial debt to total assets. 
The SPREAD is a quarterly median of daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the 
mid-point. The PRIMPACT is the quarterly median of the daily ratios computed as the absolute daily stock return divided by the British pound value of the daily trading 
volume. The VOLAT is the quarterly standard deviation of daily stock returns. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of daily turnover ratio, i.e., the daily number of shares 
traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the AIM50 index. We delete observations 
falling in the 1stand 99th percentile for all variables except for the indicator variable. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively for a t-test that tests whether the means are equal between the two sub-periods. The# indicates statistical significance at the 5% level or lower.  
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Table 2. Difference in spreads before and after switching to SETSmm across high and low 
disclosers – adopters 
 
SPREAD 
Low 
disclosers 
(a) 
High 
disclosers 
(b) 
 
Difference 
(a) - (b) t stat p-value 
Before 
switch(1) 
Number of 
observations 462 139 
0.0818 0.0466 0.0352 4.5826 0.0000 
After  
switch (2) 
Number of 
observations 169 415 
0.0393 0.0227 0.0167 4.5984 0.0000 
 
 
Difference-in-
difference p-value 
Difference 
(1) - (2) 0.0424 0.0238 0.0185 0.0270 
t stat 6.0731 6.0044 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes:  Adopters are companies that switch from the SEAQ to SETSmm trading system during the research 
period. The sample consists of a maximum of 3,086 observations from 170firms during 28 quarters from 
January 2002 to December 2008. High (Low) disclosers are observations falling into the fifth (first) quintile of 
the variable WIRES. The WIRES is a quarterly sum of all daily press release newswires calculated for each 
firm. The SPREAD is a quarterly median of the daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day as 
the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. 
  
42 
 
Table 3. The effects of the disclosure intensity and the type of trading on the bid-ask spread 
and liquidity 
 
 Dependent variable 
  
 
SPREAD SPREAD PRIMPACT PRIMPACT 
  1 2 3 4 
DIS -0.090*** -0.052*** -0.012* -0.008** 
(-2.757) (-2.928) (-1.762) (-1.974) 
SET -0.387*** -0.254*** -0.227*** -0.202*** 
(-5.337) (-5.626) (-12.107) (-19.801) 
Controls  
Ln(SIZE) -0.261*** -0.509*** -0.035*** -0.080*** 
(-3.469) (-20.116) (-2.883) (-14.072) 
Ln(VOLUME) -0.299*** -0.183*** -0.057*** -0.030*** 
(-9.427) (-7.888) (-7.466) (-5.680) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.238*** 0.042 -0.086*** -0.099*** 
(4.228) (1.254) (-5.897) (-13.123) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) -0.177** 0.088 -0.045** 0.014 
(-2.287) (1.466) (-2.326) (1.030) 
FLEV -0.036* -0.075*** 0.002 -0.007** 
(-1.830) (-5.394) (0.611) (-2.358) 
CAPINT 0.104 1.036*** 0.007 0.154*** 
(0.580) (5.809) (0.209) (3.823) 
AIM50 -0.189* -0.014 -0.040** 0.008 
(-1.733) (-0.220) (-2.066) (0.549) 
ROA  -1.765*** -1.006 -0.182 -0.346** 
(-2.707) (-1.548) (-1.207) (-2.353) 
Constant -1.319* 1.052*** 0.205 0.773*** 
(-1.828) (3.532) (1.558) (11.488) 
Observations 1169 1169 1173 1173 
R-squared 0.457 0.478 0.617 0.623 
Regression type OLS Fixed effects OLS 
Fixed 
effects 
  
Notes: Ordinary least squares and firm fixed effects specifications of disclosure and the type of trading are 
regressed on SPREAD and PRIMPACT respectively. The sample consists of the unbiased panel of 170 firms 
that switch from the quote-driven to the hybrid trading protocol during the research period between 2002 and 
2008 (Adopters). The dependant variable in columns 1 and 2 is SPREAD that is computed as the quarterly 
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median of daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the 
bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is PRIMPACT, the 
quarterly median of the daily ratios computed as the absolute daily stock return divided by the British pound 
value of the daily trading volume. The DIS is the quintile ranking based on the variable of disclosure, WIRES, 
that is computed as the quarterly sum of all the daily news wires. The SET is the binary indicator that takes the 
value of one for firm-quarters after switching to the hybrid trading structure (SETSmm) and zero otherwise. The 
SIZE is the market value of equity. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of the daily turnover ratio, i.e., the 
daily number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly 
standard deviation of the daily stock returns. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held 
shares. The FLEV is the ratio of the total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of 
long-term assets in the total assets. The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the 
AIM50 index.  The ROA is calculated as the ratio of the operating income to the total assets.  The specification 
in columns 2 and 4 include firm fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for the group correlation at the 
firm level in the regressions without firm fixed effects. We delete observations falling in the 1stand 99th 
percentile for all the variables except for the indicator variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4. Interaction effects of the disclosure intensity and the type of trading on the bid-ask spread and liquidity 
 
Dependent variable 
  SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD PRIMPACT PRIMPACT 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
DIS -0.041 0.007 0.058 0.043* 0.126*** 0.096** 
(-0.908) (0.310) (1.192) (1.860) (2.749) (2.340) 
SETS -0.380*** -0.229*** -0.421*** -0.241*** 1.487*** 1.479*** 
(-5.393) (-5.084) (-5.254) (-5.338) (7.068) (8.830) 
DIS * SETS -0.079* -0.112*** -0.075 -0.111*** -0.183*** -0.188*** 
(-1.869) (-4.138) (-1.411) (-3.930) (-3.108) (-4.080) 
Controls ( C) 
Ln(SIZE) -0.264*** -0.516*** -0.284*** -0.523*** -1.031*** -0.936*** 
(-3.457) (-20.511) (-3.478) (-20.918) (-27.797) (-22.484) 
Ln(VOLUME) -0.299*** -0.183*** -0.333*** -0.188*** -0.905*** -0.821*** 
(-9.378) (-7.948) (-10.129) (-8.142) (-26.040) (-21.837) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.241*** 0.043 0.215*** 0.045 1.101*** 1.118*** 
(4.278) (1.300) (3.875) (1.331) (17.564) (21.235) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) -0.176** 0.102* -0.171** 0.114* 0.040 0.080 
(-2.274) (1.714) (-2.198) (1.905) (0.552) (0.796) 
FLEV -0.036* -0.074*** -0.034* -0.075*** 0.020 0.016 
(-1.825) (-5.353) (-1.718) (-5.390) (1.265) (0.708) 
CAPINT 0.094 1.081*** 0.124 1.111*** -0.083 0.259 
(0.524) (6.097) (0.684) (6.256) (-0.770) (0.884) 
AIM50 -0.180* 0.005 -0.230* 0.006 0.012 -0.030 
(-1.662) (0.073) (-1.899) (0.091) (0.180) (-0.320) 
ROA -1.695** -0.889 -1.611** -0.707 0.882 -0.080 
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(-2.561) (-1.377) (-2.604) (-1.086) (1.526) (-0.081) 
Constant -1.527* 0.992*** -1.600* 1.032*** 0.069 -0.411 
(-1.921) (3.378) (-1.816) (3.498) (0.163) (-0.862) 
Observations 1169 1169 1169 1169 953 953 
R-squared 0.460 0.487 0.446 0.483 0.822 0.686 
Regression type OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
Notes: Ordinary least squares and firm fixed effects specifications of disclosure and the type of trading are regressed on SPREAD and PRIMPACT respectively. The sample 
consists of the unbiased panel of 170 firms that switch from the quote-driven to the hybrid trading protocol during the research period between 2002 and 2008 (Adopters). 
The dependant variable in columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 is SPREAD that is computed as the quarterly median of daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day as the 
absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is PRIMPACT, the quarterly median of the daily 
ratios computed as the absolute daily stock return divided by the British pound value of the daily trading volume. DIS is the mean adjusted quintile ranking based on the 
disclosure variable WIRES. Variable WIRES is computed using two alternative methods. In Columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 it is computed as the quarterly sum of all daily news wires, 
whereas in Columns 3 and 4 it is computed as the quarterly sum of daily RNS wires. The SET is the binary indicator that takes the value of one for firm-quarters after 
switching to the hybrid trading structure (SETSmm) and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the market value of equity. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of the daily turnover 
ratio, i.e., the daily number of shares traded, divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly standard deviation of the daily stock returns. The 
OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held shares. The FLEV is the ratio of the total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of long-
term assets in the total assets. The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the AIM50 index.  The ROA is calculated as the ratio of the operating 
income to the total assets. The specification in Columns 2 and 4 include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for group correlation at the firm level in regressions 
without firm fixed effects. We delete observations falling in the 1st and99thpercentile for all the variables except for the indicator variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
the parenthesis. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
46 
 
Table 5 Panel A. Interaction effects of the disclosure improvements and the type of trading 
on the bid-ask spread 
 
Dependent variable 
  SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD SPREAD 
WIRES is 
based on all 
newswires  
WIRES is 
based on all 
newswires  
WIRES is 
based on RNS 
WIRES is 
based on RNS 
  1 2 3 4 
+WIRES -0.051 0.011 0.306* 0.295 
(-0.274) (0.054) (1.737) (1.516) 
SETS 0.624 0.501 0.282 0.311 
(1.081) (0.884) (0.605) (0.650) 
 +WIRES * SETS -0.437** -0.425* -0.682*** -0.654** 
(-2.095) (-1.775) (-2.885) (-2.528) 
Controls ( C) 
Ln(SIZE) -0.449* -0.469** -0.227 -0.244 
(-1.914) (-2.328) (-1.448) (-1.452) 
Ln(VOLUME) -0.187 -0.034 -0.381*** -0.363** 
(-1.017) (-0.182) (-3.668) (-2.557) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.619*** 0.693** 0.406* 0.377* 
(2.836) (2.222) (1.743) (1.703) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) 1.417 1.320*** -0.021 -0.053 
(1.522) (3.338) (-0.071) (-0.156) 
FLEV -0.074 -0.063 -0.011 -0.017 
(-1.042) (-0.645) (-0.130) (-0.192) 
CAPINT -0.575 -0.718 -0.414 -0.393 
(-0.771) (-0.892) (-0.648) (-0.675) 
AIM50 0.463 0.826 -0.155 -0.092 
(0.912) (1.594) (-0.382) (-0.235) 
ROA 0.163 -0.602 -2.515 -2.893 
(0.092) (-0.193) (-1.014) (-0.925) 
Constant 2.303 3.873 -3.936** -3.806* 
(0.633) (1.519) (-2.016) (-1.785) 
Observations 110 110 98 98 
R-squared 0.286 0.302 0.300 0.308 
Regression type OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect 
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Table 5 Panel B. Frequency of disclosure improvements before and after the switch 
 
             
+WIRES Before   After 
Frequency Mean Frequency Mean 
All newswires 730 40.79589 761 49.72142 
RNS 649 14.2188   704 19.16761 
 
Notes: In Panel A, a reduced sample of Adopters is constructed by matching observations by disclosure rank 
and then by size across the two periods (pre and post SETSmm), so that the disclosure distributions are 
comparable before and after switching to SETSmm.  The dependant variable is the change in variable SPREAD. 
SPREAD  is computed as the quarterly median of daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day 
as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. WIRES  is the positive 
change in variable WIRES. WIRES is computed using two alternative methods. In Columns 1 and 2 it is 
computed as the quarterly sum of all daily news wires, whereas in Columns 3 and 4 it is computed as the 
quarterly sum of daily RNS wires. The SET is the binary indicator that takes the value of one for firm-quarters 
after switching to the hybrid trading structure (SETSmm) and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the market value of 
equity. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of the daily turnover ratio, i.e., the daily number of shares traded, 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly standard deviation of the daily 
stock returns. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held shares. The FLEV is the ratio of 
the total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of long-term assets in the total assets. 
The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the AIM50 index. The ROA is 
calculated as the ratio of the operating income to the total assets.  The specification in Columns 2 and 4 include 
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for  group correlation at the firm level in regressions without firm 
fixed effects. We delete observations falling in the 1st and 99th  percentile for all the variables except for the 
indicator variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. In Panel B a full range of unmatched sample 
observations is used consisting of all firms that switch from the quote-driven to the hybrid trading protocol 
during the research period between 2002 and 2008.  
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Table 6. The effects of disclosure intensity on bid-ask spread and liquidity before and after 
the introduction of SETSmm – non-adopters 
 
 Dependant variable 
  SPREAD PRIMPACT
  1 2 
DIS -0.014 0.003 
(-0.931) (0.042) 
POST -0.038 -0.000 
(-0.681) (-0.002) 
DIS * POST 0.005 0.013 
(0.326) (0.188) 
Controls ( C) 
Ln(SIZE) -0.407*** -0.796*** 
(-19.974) (-9.601) 
Ln(VOLUME) -0.143*** -0.872*** 
(-9.716) (-13.493) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.274*** 1.235*** 
(13.216) (13.032) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) 0.052 -0.046 
(1.178) (-0.272) 
FLEV -0.034*** 0.014 
(-3.621) (0.363) 
CAPINT -0.204 -0.403 
(-1.494) (-0.801) 
AIM50 0.037 -0.533 
(0.468) (-1.120) 
ROA -2.348*** -0.814 
(-4.814) (-0.398) 
Constant 1.369*** -1.343 
(6.331) (-1.477) 
Observations 1181 590 
R-squared 0.548 0.590 
Regression type Fixed effect Fixed effect 
Notes: Firm fixed effects specification of disclosure regressed on SPREAD and PRIMPACT respectively in 
periods before and after the introduction of the hybrid trading system to AIM. The sample consists of unbiased 
panel of 114 firms that traded under the quote-driven trading protocol during the research period between 2002 
and 2008 (Non-adopters). The dependant variable in Column1 is SPREAD that is computed as the quarterly 
median of daily quoted spreads measured at the end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the 
bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. The dependent variable in Column 2 is PRIMPACT, the quarterly 
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median of the daily ratios computed as the absolute daily stock return divided by the British pound value of the 
daily trading volume. The DIS is the mean adjusted quintile ranking based on the variable disclosure WIRES 
that is computed as the quarterly sum of all the daily news wires. The POST is the binary indicator that takes the 
value of one for firm quarters after the introduction of SETSmm (last quarter in 2005) and zero otherwise. The 
SIZE is the market value of equity. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of daily turnover ratio, i.e., the daily 
number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly 
standard deviation of the daily stock returns. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held 
shares. The FLEV is the ratio of the total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of 
long-term assets in total assets. The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the 
AIM50 index.  The ROA is calculated as the ratio of the operating income to total assets.  We delete 
observations falling in the 1st and 99th percentile for all variables except for the indicator variable. Robust t-
statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels respectively.  
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Table 7. Disclosure, trading and the bid-ask spread: the instrumental variables approach 
 
 2SLS 
  DIS SPREAD 
  1 2 
DIS 0.111 
(0.390) 
SETS 0.448*** -0.456*** 
(4.896) (-3.354) 
Controls  
Ln(SIZE) 0.189*** -0.322*** 
(4.693) (-5.443) 
Ln(VOLUME) 0.383*** -0.381*** 
(9.599) (-3.474) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.225*** 0.203*** 
(3.538) (2.623) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) -0.098 -0.144** 
(-1.194) (-2.509) 
FLEV -0.019 -0.030** 
(-0.917) (-2.257) 
CAPINT -0.213 0.192* 
(-1.416) (1.742) 
AIM50 0.482*** -0.212 
(4.534) (-1.404) 
ROA (at t=0) -4.430* -1.655*** 
(-1.657) (-3.712) 
Exclustion restrictions  
ROA (at t=-1) 7.466** 
(2.123) 
ROA (at t=-2) -1.608 
(-1.102) 
Constant 3.846*** -1.850 
(8.339) (-1.630) 
Observations 1037 1037 
R-squared 0.226 0.367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217 
Partial F-statistic 
2.34 
(p=0.0970) 
Partial R-squared 0.005 
Overidentifying restrictions test 
Chi2 = 0.108 
(p=0.7428) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
F= 0.58120 
(p=0.4460) 
Regression type First stage IV Reduced form 
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with fixed 
effects 
(Second stage) with 
fixed effects 
    
Notes: The sample consists of the unbiased panel of 170 firms that switch from the quote-driven to the hybrid 
trading protocol during the research period between 2002 and 2008 (Adopters). All specifications are estimated 
using firm fixed effects. In columns 1 and 2 we estimate the 2SLS regression with firm fixed effects. In Column 
1 we report the first stage of an instrumental variables (IV) regression with ROA in quarters t = -1 and t = -2 as 
instruments for the disclosure intensity (DIS). In Column 2 we report the results of the reduced-form equation 
(second stage).   SPREAD is computed as the quarterly median of the daily quoted spreads measured at the end 
of each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point. The DIS 
is the quintile ranking based on the variable disclosure WIRES that is computed as the quarterly sum of all of 
the daily news wires. The SET is the binary indicator that takes the value of one for firm-quarters after 
switching to the hybrid trading structure (SETSmm) and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the market value of equity. 
The VOLUME is the quarterly median of the daily turnover ratio, i.e., the daily number of shares traded divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly standard deviation of the daily stock 
returns. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held shares. The FLEV is the ratio of the 
total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of long-term assets in the total assets. The 
AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the AIM50 index.  The ROA is calculated as 
the ratio of operating income to total assets.  We delete the observations falling in the 1st  and 99th percentile for 
all variables except for the indicator variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. The *,**, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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Figure 1.The effects of disclosure intensity on bid-ask spread before and after the switch 
from SEAQ to SETSmm for adopters 
 
 
 
Notes: On the y-axis, SPREAD is computed as the quarterly median of the daily quoted spreads measured at the 
end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point.  On 
the x-axis, low (high) disclosers correspond to the lowest (highest) quintile ranking of the variable WIRES, 
computed as the quarterly sum of daily all news wires. The adopters are companies that switch from the SEAQ 
to SETSmm trading system during the research period.   
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Figure 2.The effects of the disclosure intensity on the bid-ask spread before and after the 
introduction of SETSmm(switch from SEAQ to SETSmm) to non-adopters (adopters) 
 
 
 
Notes: On the y-axis, SPREAD is computed as the quarterly median of the daily quoted spreads measured at the 
end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point.  On 
the x-axis, low (high) disclosers correspond to the lowest (highest) quintile ranking of the variable WIRES, 
computed as the quarterly sum of daily all news wires. The adopters are companies that switch from the SEAQ 
to SETSmm trading system during the research period. The non-adopters are firms that trade on the SEAQ only.
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Appendix 
To empirically assess the impact of lagged (in addition to contemporaneous) 
performance measures on the bid-ask spread, we extend model (1) by adding two lagged 
values for the performance proxy ROA. The results reported in column 1 of Table A show 
that, while lagged values of ROA dated t = -2 and t= -1 are not statistically significant, the 
contemporaneous ROA (at t=0) exhibits a negative and significant effect on SPREAD as 
predicted. Next, we check whether firms disclose more in response to contemporaneous and 
lagged performance. Results reported in column 2 of Table A show a negative and significant 
contemporaneous effect of performance on disclosure (the coefficient on ROA in t=0 is -
6.655 with a p-value < 0.001). On the other hand, the first lag of ROA has a significantly 
positive impact on disclosure (the coefficient on ROA at t= -1 is 7.122 with a p-value < 
0.05), while the second lag of ROA is negative but weakly significant. 
Collectively, the findings in columns 1 and 2 are consistent with the conjecture that 
managers rapidly step up disclosure activities in response to the contemporaneous reports of 
performance failures (as indicated by the negative coefficient on ROA at t=0 in column 2), 
especially if these performance reports might be picked up by investors instantly, triggering 
particularly large impacts on their bid-ask spreads (significantly negative coefficient on ROA 
at t=0 in column 1). For example, earlier research suggests that executives of firms 
strategically manage the timing of voluntary disclosures for a number of reasons. In 
particular, Skinner (1997) shows that management is more likely to accelerate the disclosure 
of adverse news to try and reduce potential litigation costs. On the other hand, the 
significantly positive effect of lagged performance on the current disclosure is in line with the 
view that firms release good news with a delay. For example, a potential reason for strategic 
timing is because management can influence the value of stock-based compensation plans if 
they rush forward bad news and delay good news around award dates (Aboody and Kasznik, 
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2000). For growth stocks, stock-based compensation is often the main form of compensation 
to management and so we expect the type of strategic disclosure strategies identified by 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) to apply to TTGS.  
The results set out in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the current disclosure appears to 
increase in response to the prior period’s performance success (good news) and 
contemporaneous performance failure (bad news). As for the current bid-ask spread, it is 
affected by contemporaneous disclosure (negative and significant coefficient on DIS in 
column 1) and contemporaneous performance (negative and significant coefficient on ROA 
at t=0 in column 1), but not lagged performance. This is consistent with the proposition that 
the prior period’s performance affects the bid-ask spread through the current disclosure 
channel.   
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Table A. The instrumental variables approach: assessment of the validity of instruments 
 Dependent variable 
  SPREAD DIS 
  1 2 
DIS -0.051*** 
(-2.622) 
SETS -0.230*** 0.295*** 
(-4.544) (3.460) 
Controls  
Ln(SIZE) -0.530*** 0.280*** 
(-18.078) (5.727) 
Ln(VOLUME) -0.183*** 0.303*** 
(-6.932) (6.933) 
Ln(VOLAT) 0.019 0.191*** 
(0.510) (3.089) 
Ln(OWNERDIS) 0.107 -0.100 
(1.611) (-0.887) 
FLEV -0.079*** -0.002 
(-5.245) (-0.070) 
CAPINT 1.056*** -0.998*** 
(5.180) (-2.891) 
AIM50 0.006 -0.196* 
(0.085) (-1.709) 
ROA (at t=0) -3.796*** -6.655*** 
(-2.590) (-2.682) 
ROA (at t=-1) 2.374 7.122** 
(1.437) (2.545) 
ROA (at t=-2) 0.071 -3.380* 
(0.082) (-1.861) 
Constant 1.193*** 2.672*** 
(3.522) (4.708) 
Observations 1037 1041 
R-squared 0.455 0.154 
Regression type Fixed effects Fixed effects 
      
Notes: The sample consists of the unbiased panel of 170 firms that switch from the quote-driven to the hybrid 
trading protocol during the research period between 2002 and 2008 (Adopters). In Column 1 we relate SPREAD 
to contemporaneous and up to two lags of performance proxy ROA and to a set of control variables.  In Column 
2 we relate DIS to contemporaneous and up to two lags of ROA and to a set of controls. All specifications are 
estimated using firm fixed effects.   SPREAD is computed as the quarterly median of the daily quoted spreads 
measured at the end of each trading day as the absolute difference between the bid and ask price divided by the 
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mid-point. The DIS is the quintile ranking based on the variable disclosure WIRES that is computed as the 
quarterly sum of all of the daily news wires. The SET is the binary indicator that takes the value of one for firm-
quarters after switching to the hybrid trading structure (SETSmm) and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the market 
value of equity. The VOLUME is the quarterly median of the daily turnover ratio, i.e., the daily number of 
shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. The VOLAT is the quarterly standard deviation 
of the daily stock returns. The OWNERDIS is computed as the percentage of widely held shares. The FLEV is 
the ratio of the total financial debt to the total assets. The CAPINT is the proportion of long-term assets in the 
total assets. The AIM50 is the binary variable indicating that the firm is included in the AIM50 index.  The 
ROA is calculated as the ratio of operating income to total assets.  We delete the observations falling in the 1st  
and 99th percentile for all variables except for the indicator variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in the 
parenthesis. The *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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1Significant literature exists on the modelling of how the transparency of the trading mechanism affects price 
formation – see for instance Chapter 10 of De Jong and Rindi (2009). That literature focuses upon the relative 
gains to various types of traders under various transparency settings and not the potential benefits to firms, 
which is our main concern here. 
2See for instance Christie et al. (1994). 
3 Interestingly, Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) analyse the introduction of a hybrid (order protocol with market 
makers) market to Italy. 
4 See for instance Mendoza (2008). 
5For example, AIM firms are not required to have had prior trading nor do they have to seek prior shareholder 
approval for transactions, there is no minimum market capitalization or minimum public float. The only 
disclosure obligation for firms is the “general duty of disclosure requiring information which the issuer 
reasonably considers necessary to enable investors to form a full understanding of the financial position of the 
applicant.” Considering that AIM firms predominantly target institutional investors with specialist knowledge, 
disclosure strategies of AIM firms tend to relate to voluntary dissemination of relevant information to those 
investors.   
6 In order to additionally check whether the firm’s life-cycle stage (age) might differentially affect the bid-ask 
spread for the switching subsample, we hand collect the data on all the firms’ births (i.e., on the year of business 
inception). We find that the average life cycle (age) of the two subsamples is not statistically significantly 
different, that is, differences in age are not driving differences in spread.  
7In the UK, firms are required to list information on a primary information provider like the Regulatory News 
Service (RNS) before talking to individual investors. The RNS is the primary timely source of information that 
news wire contributors use to base a report.  
8 See Bushee and Miller (2012). 
9In order to test the validity of our disclosure measure, we also use the RNS release instead of all newswires to 
compute the variables WIRES. We are thankful to the anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
10 By ranking firms into quintiles of the variable WIRES separately for each subsample of firms (switchers and 
non-switchers) and pooling over all quarterly periods for that particular subsample, we are able to use firms as 
their own controls in the regression models estimated separately for switchers and non-switchers. In this way, 
we are able to analyze the effect of disclosure intensity on the bid-ask spread before and after the quarter in 
which a particular firm switches to SETSmm (in the regression of switchers), or before and after the quarter of 
the introduction of SETSmm (in the regression of non-switchers) 
11 This type of calculation means that the number of high disclosers is always 20% over the whole sample 
period, but within a particular quarter it can differ.  
12 Defined in terms of all newswires.  
13 Variable WIRES measured by RNS exhibits similar behaviour.  
14  Note that the coefficient on SET is the partial derivative of SPREAD with respect to SET, holding DIS 
constant at zero and that  DIS=0 is outside the data range. Hence, in order to provide a more meaningful 
interpretation of the coefficient on SET, in the interaction models, we carry out the centering of variable DIS by 
subtracting the sample mean of DIS from DIS values in each observation, so that the mean of DIS is now zero. 
This way, the coefficient on SET now shows the difference in SPREAD between pre- and post-switching 
periods at the mean value of DIS. Also, note that the slope coefficients, their standard errors and t-test are the 
same in centered as in uncentered equations (Aiken and West, 1991). 
15 We thank the anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
16 Since the period of estimation is before the introduction of SETSmm, variables SET and DIS*SET take the 
value of zero by construction. 
17 We observe similar patterns in data for the RNS specification of variable WIRES.  
18Datastream expresses daily trading volume in thousands of GBPs. Hence, the construct PRIMPACT captures 
the percentage by which a share price moves in £1,000 of daily trading volume.   
19 In order to check whether the life cycle might be a correlated omitted variable, we include the age of the firm 
as an additional covariate (unreported) and find that it does not affect our results. However, we recognize that 
the age of the firm might not be an appropriate proxy for lifecycle as market conditions might differ for firms of 
a similar age but from different industries, so we collect information on the SIC industry classification for each 
firm and compare the industry compositions between pre- and post-switching periods. We find that the 
observations are fairly evenly spread among the industries. To further check the possibility that firms before and 
after the switch might be in a different life cycle, we collect the data on turnover growth (see the study by 
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Anthony and Ramesh, 1992 on using turnover growth as a proxy for life cycle) for all companies over the key 
SETSmm adoption period from 2005 to 2007 and find statistically insignificant difference in mean growth rates 
between the pre- and post-switching periods. Moreover, in unreported analyses, we include three additional 
firm-level controls simultaneously in the model: (1) turnover growth,  (2) its interaction with DIS which should 
capture the differential behaviour between low and high growth companies (i.e., between firms in early versus 
those in the later stages of life cycle) in terms of their disclosures’ impact on SPREAD, and (3) in order to test 
whether potential life cycle differences between firms before and after their switch to SETSmm influence how 
their disclosure activities affect spread we add a three-way interaction between growth, DIS and SET. We find 
that our original results continue to hold and that the life cycle does not appear to influence how disclosure 
affects spread either pre- or post-switching to SETSmm. We confirm the conjecture that the type of trading is 
the main mechanism through which TTGS seem to reinforce the effects of their disclosure activities on bid-ask 
spread.  
20 In order to address a potential concern that disclosure levels are significantly different before compared to 
after the introduction of SETSmm (i.e, it is theoretically possible that majority of low (high) disclosers are 
concentrated in periods before (after) the switch to SETSmm), which might bias the results from regression (2), 
we construct a balanced sample where the disclosure distributions are comparable before and after the switch. 
Within each disclosure rank (1 to 5) and across the two periods (pre and post SETSmm) we match observations 
by size so that the disclosure quintile composition is constant across the two periods.  Using the matched sample 
we re-estimate model (2) and find that our original findings continue to hold and that they do not appear to 
be driven by differences in disclosure distributions before and after the switch.  The unreported results 
indicate that a comparable extent of disclosure activity after switching to SETSmm affects spread in a more 
pronounced manner relative to the period before.  
21The estimate for the combined effect of disclosure and trading (from the fixed effects specification) that is 
computed as the sum of the coefficients on DIS and DIS*SET is -0.105 (i.e., 0.007 – 0.112) with a p-value of 
0.05 (not reported in Table 4). 
22 In unreported analysis which re-estimates model (2) by replacing levels in SPREAD and DIS with their 
respective changes, we confirm the reinforcing or multiplicative association between disclosure and hybrid type 
of trading.  
23 Our results continue to hold if we include the life cycle proxies and their interactions with DIS and DIS and 
SET, respectively.  
24This result is consistent with the concept that for small and less frequently traded stocks, changes in the 
disclosure strategy might actually increase volatility and illiquidity (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).    
25The estimate for the combined effect of disclosure and trading computed as the sum of the coefficients on DIS 
and DIS * SET has a p-value of 0.001 (not reported in Table 4).  
26 The requirement for comparable distributions of disclosure level in quarters before and after the switch is 
appropriate for the regression analysis that tests the strength of the impact of disclosure on spread pre- versus  
post-switch. This requirement is now relaxed and the full range of sample observations is used in order to obtain 
a total number of frequencies of disclosure improvements. 
 
27 The results for the switching group (adopters) are not reported as they are not materially different from those 
obtained estimating model (2) and reported in Table 4.  
28The test of the significant difference between the coefficients on DIS across the two classes of firms using the 
seemingly unrelated regression model is based on the Chow test (not reported) with a p-value of 0.273. 
29 Our results remain robust if we include turnover growth as a life cycle proxy and its interactions with DIS and 
POST, respectively. Hence, taken together with the results concerning adopters (see endnote 18) these findings 
alleviate concerns that potential life cycle differences between adopting and non-adopting groups might affect 
our original results.  
30 We obtain almost identical estimates of the slope and intercept coefficients for the Adopters sample if we 
employ model (2a) instead of (2). In other words, if we replace “Adopters before (after) switch” with “Adopters 
before (after) 2005q4”. 
31 The direction of the bias depends on the response variable (market outcome) in question. For example, 
consider a scenario where a thinly traded risky start-up AIM firm chooses not to publicly disclose information 
on a new project in the pipeline due to high proprietary costs. Thus, ignoring factors (such as the riskiness of 
operations) that determine a firm’s disclosure activities and also affect its bid-ask spread would yield a 
downwards bias in the OLS coefficients that exaggerate the effect of disclosure on the bid-ask spread. 
  
32 Note that although the focus of the paper is on the interaction between DIS and SET, the purpose of the 
analysis in subsection 5.4 is to check for the endogeneity of the disclosure variable and to validate the method’s 
approach used in models (1) and (2). 
60 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
33The R-squares of the first-stage regression indicate the strength of the correlation between the endogenous 
variable in question and the set of instruments. Higher values indicate stronger instruments, and instrumental 
variable estimators exhibit less bias when the instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.  
If the correlation is weak, then the 2SLS approach can produce biased estimates if the instrumental variables are 
even slightly endogenous (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
34In this test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance term from the 
equation (1). If this hypothesis is rejected, one or more instruments do not appear to be uncorrelated with the 
errorand are deemed endogenous.  
